Why Trump’s Theory of Coercion Failed Against the Islamic Republic of Iran
On August 5, ship-tracking data recorded only eight vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Before the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, between 130 and 140 ships crossed the waterway on a typical day. The tracked total may exclude vessels operating without active transponders, but the scale of the decline is unmistakable: five months into a campaign intended in part to restore freedom of navigation, commercial traffic remained a fraction of its prewar level.
The same day, a second piece of news sharpened the contradiction. Regional and Iranian officials told Reuters that a proposed arrangement negotiated through Oman could give Tehran authority over ships entering the Persian Gulf. U.S. officials had repeatedly rejected any Iranian control over the strait. President Donald Trump, meanwhile, had insisted only days earlier that the United States was already in control: “Iran doesn’t control the Strait. We control the Strait.”
This juxtaposition offers more than an embarrassing contrast between presidential rhetoric and maritime data. It exposes the failure of a theory of power that has guided Trump’s confrontation with the Islamic Republic. That theory holds that overwhelming force, personal unpredictability, public humiliation and escalating threats can compel a weaker adversary to concede quickly. In this view, the decisive variable is the will of the stronger leader: demonstrate sufficient resolve, impose sufficient pain and the opponent’s political resistance will collapse.
The United States has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to inflict damage. It has killed senior Iranian leaders, struck missile and nuclear facilities, degraded military assets and blockaded Iranian ports. But destruction and compellence are not the same achievement. As of August 5, Washington had not secured a durable nuclear settlement, restored normal traffic through Hormuz, produced a stable ceasefire or forced Tehran to accept the political terms Trump originally demanded. The Islamic Republic had suffered severe military losses without providing the political compliance those losses were supposed to purchase.
That distinction is the central argument of this article. Trump’s strategy failed not because American threats lacked credibility. On the contrary, the threat of further punishment was highly credible. It failed because the administration concentrated on only one half of coercive diplomacy. It proved that resistance would be costly but gave Tehran no credible reason to believe that compliance would end the pressure. By expanding the dispute from nuclear and maritime issues to the survival and leadership of the Iranian state, Washington made capitulation potentially more dangerous to the regime than continued war.
How Strategic Failure Should Be Measured
Calling the strategy a failure requires precision. It does not mean that the Islamic Republic has won, that the U.S. military has been defeated or that Iranian society has benefited from the conflict. Iran’s people, economy and infrastructure have borne enormous costs. Nor does it mean that no agreement can still emerge. Negotiations were continuing when this assessment was written.
Strategic performance, however, should be measured against stated political objectives, not against the quantity of damage inflicted. The White House described the goals of Operation Epic Fury as the destruction of Iran’s missiles and launchers, the elimination of its naval and defence-industrial capabilities, the permanent denial of a nuclear weapon, the weakening of its regional proxies and the preservation of movement through the Strait of Hormuz. Trump also introduced broader political demands, including “unconditional surrender” and an American role in deciding who would be permitted to lead Iran.
On April 8, the White House declared that the military objectives had been met in 38 days and presented the ceasefire as proof that “peace through strength” had prevailed. On June 19, it described a new memorandum with Iran as a historic agreement that would reopen Hormuz and prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. Both declarations proved premature. Fighting resumed, the ceasefires fractured and commercial shipping remained severely depressed. A claim of coercive success that repeatedly requires renewed coercion is, at minimum, evidence that the political outcome was never secured.
The relevant analytical question is therefore not whether the United States could punish Iran. It plainly could. The question is why punishment failed to produce a stable change in Iranian behaviour.
The Strongman Theory of International Politics
There is no single academic doctrine formally known as “strongman theory.” The term is better understood as a political operating system. It rests on several connected beliefs: that international conflicts are contests between individual leaders; that boldness creates credibility; that unpredictability frightens adversaries; that public deadlines force decisions; that eliminating leaders disorganises the systems beneath them; and that compromise by the stronger power communicates weakness.
Trump’s conduct during the war closely followed this logic. He alternated threats of massive strikes with claims that an agreement was imminent. He threatened Iran’s bridges and power plants, suggested that an entire civilisation could die, demanded unconditional surrender and treated the selection of Iran’s supreme leader as a question subject to American approval. The message was intentionally personal: Iran was not confronting an impersonal coalition with limited demands, but a president willing to escalate beyond the expectations of conventional statecraft.
This approach resembles the “madman theory” historically associated with Richard Nixon. Its strategic premise is rational even if its presentation is not: a leader perceived as unusually risk-tolerant may make threats that a more restrained leader could not credibly issue. But research by Roseanne McManus finds that a reputation for madness is at best conditionally useful in crisis bargaining and often harmful to general deterrence. The reason is a commitment problem. The target may believe the leader is willing to attack, yet doubt that concessions will satisfy him.
Trump therefore succeeded at one task the strongman method is designed to perform. Tehran could not dismiss his threats as empty. The error was assuming that credible punishment alone would be sufficient.
Coercion Requires an Exit
Thomas Schelling’s foundational work distinguishes brute force from coercion. Brute force physically takes or destroys an objective. Coercion seeks to alter an adversary’s choice. The distinction matters because reopening a shipping lane, accepting a verification regime, ending enrichment or implementing a ceasefire cannot be accomplished by American firepower alone. Each requires the Iranian state to act.
Coercion is thus a bargaining process conducted under the threat or use of violence. The coercer needs the target’s cooperation, even when the relationship is profoundly unequal. This is why the political meaning of force matters as much as its destructive capacity.
Matthew Cebul, Allan Dafoe and Nuno Monteiro identify two credibility requirements in such bargaining. The first is the familiar one: the coercer must credibly threaten punishment if the target refuses. The second is assurance: the coercer must also credibly promise restraint if the target complies. A powerful state may find the first task easier precisely because of its military superiority. But that same superiority can make the second harder. If the stronger actor can demand more after receiving an initial concession, why should the weaker actor believe compliance will end the contest?
Trump’s policy magnified this assurance problem. Consider the decision facing Tehran. If it reopened Hormuz, would Washington remove the blockade, or simply proceed to its nuclear demands? If it accepted nuclear restrictions, would the United States stop, or move next to missile disarmament, the dismantling of the Revolutionary Guard and regime change? If it signed a ceasefire, would another accusation restart the bombing days later?
The administration never established a stable hierarchy among its aims. Nuclear denial, maritime access, proxy warfare, missile capacity, regime leadership and domestic political change became intertwined. Iranian compliance on one issue offered no protection against escalation on another. The repeated sequence of threat, pause, negotiation and renewed attack reinforced the belief that American demands could expand after every concession.
This is the paradox at the core of the strongman trap: the more convincingly Trump signalled that he might do anything, the less convincingly he could promise that doing what he asked would be enough.
From Coercive Diplomacy to a War of Survival
Coercion is most likely to work when the demand is limited and the cost of compliance is lower than the expected cost of resistance. Trump’s rhetoric reversed that calculation for the Iranian leadership.
The demand for nuclear limits, however severe, can in principle be negotiated. The same is true of shipping arrangements, sanctions, inspections and missile deployments. “Unconditional surrender” is different. So is a foreign power’s claim to approve a country’s next leader. Once the political survival of the governing elite becomes part of the bargain, concessions cease to be merely costly. They can become suicidal.
Todd Sechser calls one version of this dynamic “Goliath’s curse.” Strong states often issue compellent threats against much weaker ones, yet those threats frequently fail. Military superiority can produce informational arrogance: the stronger state underestimates the reputational and domestic costs the target would incur by submitting. It consequently demands too much and offers too little compensation for compliance.
The succession following Ali Khamenei’s death illustrates the mechanism. After the supreme leader was killed in the opening phase of the war, Trump publicly rejected the prospect of Mojtaba Khamenei succeeding him. Iran’s Assembly of Experts appointed Mojtaba anyway. The appointment may have been hereditary, deeply repressive and illegitimate in the eyes of many Iranians. But for the ruling coalition, defying an American veto also served a strategic purpose. Accepting Washington’s authority over the succession would have advertised the regime’s subordination and threatened the internal standing of every institution invested in its survival.
Jessica Weeks’s work on authoritarian audience costs helps explain why Tehran did not behave like a unitary actor free of domestic constraints. Autocratic rulers often answer to narrower audiences than democratic leaders, but those audiences still matter. Clerical networks, security chiefs, Revolutionary Guard commanders and economic interests tied to the state can punish a leader who endangers the system that sustains them. Iran’s new leadership therefore faced an internal credibility problem of its own: it had to demonstrate to regime insiders that it would not exchange institutional survival for temporary relief.
By personalising the war, Trump also personalised the cost of Iranian surrender. A leader whose father and family members had been killed, and whose own legitimacy had been publicly denied by Washington, had powerful reasons to prove that violence could not determine the succession. American threats may have weakened Iran materially while strengthening the domestic political incentives for defiance.
Battlefield Asymmetry, Bargaining Asymmetry
The material balance between the two sides was never in doubt. The United States possessed vastly superior air and naval power, intelligence, long-range strike capability and logistical depth. But military asymmetry does not automatically produce bargaining asymmetry in the same direction.
Andrew Mack’s classic study of asymmetric conflict explains why. For an external great power, war is usually limited: it competes with domestic economic priorities, public opinion and other international commitments. For the weaker actor, a conflict perceived as existential can command far greater tolerance for loss. The strong power must achieve a positive result. The weak power may need only to prevent that result long enough for the costs of war to alter the stronger side’s calculations.
Iran converted geography into bargaining power. It could not defeat the U.S. Navy in a conventional war, but it did not need to. Mines, missiles, drones, small boats and the threat of attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure could keep insurers cautious, shipping companies away and regional governments alarmed. Washington could escort a vessel or destroy an Iranian launcher. It could not order private commerce to treat Hormuz as safe.
That gap explains why Trump’s claim of American control over the strait was strategically misleading. Military control can mean the ability to enter an area, strike within it or prevent selected ships from moving. Commercial control requires predictable safety at scale. On August 5, only eight tracked vessels crossed a waterway that once carried 130 to 140 each day. Gulf oil and condensate exports in July were still 40 per cent below their prewar level. The United States controlled escalation in many military domains; Iran retained the ability to deny economic normality.
Time also imposed material constraints on Washington. Reuters reported that the U.S. Army had used virtually all of its worldwide inventory of ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles during the conflict, as well as slightly less than half of the American global stockpile of Tomahawks. The Pentagon maintained that it possessed the capabilities required for its missions, and the United States retained many other means of attack. The strategic point is not that America had run out of weapons. It is that compellence was consuming scarce assets needed for other theatres while still failing to secure compliance.
Domestic time horizons moved in the same direction. A June Reuters/Ipsos poll found that only 24 per cent of Americans believed the war had been worth its costs; just 23 per cent thought the United States had emerged in a stronger position relative to Iran. By July, 79 per cent expected a prolonged conflict. Rising fuel prices and approaching midterm elections did not determine policy automatically, but they were observable constraints. Tehran could infer that Washington’s willingness to sustain an open-ended campaign was not limitless.
This created a reversal the strongman theory failed to anticipate. The United States possessed escalation dominance, but Iran possessed considerable endurance leverage. The stronger side could impose greater pain on any given day. The weaker side could make the final political settlement more expensive with every passing week.
Why Decapitation Did Not Decapitate the Regime
The strongman framework also misdiagnosed the nature of the Islamic Republic. It treated Iran as though political authority radiated from one man and would therefore collapse when that man was removed. Ali Khamenei was unquestionably central to the system. But the system was not identical to him.
Iran’s regime combines personal authority with an institutional network: the Revolutionary Guard, intelligence organisations, clerical bodies, the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, economic foundations and a large coercive bureaucracy. These organisations compete, but they also share an interest in preventing regime collapse. Killing the arbiter can create confusion; it can also shift power toward the institutions best equipped to operate under conditions of war.
That appears to have happened. The succession proceeded, hard-liners consolidated their position and the IRGC’s political role expanded. In the Journal of Democracy, Roya Izadi argued that the war was making the Revolutionary Guard more deeply embedded in Iranian politics rather than destroying it. A campaign intended to weaken the regime’s coercive core may have increased its authority over the state.
This outcome is not evidence of popular unity behind the Islamic Republic. A government can be profoundly illegitimate and still prove institutionally resilient under foreign attack. Indeed, external war can benefit an unpopular security apparatus by allowing it to suppress dissent as collaboration, redirect resources toward coercion and wrap institutional survival in nationalist language.
The result is especially damaging for Iranian civil society. Tactical decapitation from abroad can eliminate senior figures while strengthening the organisations most capable of domestic repression. The removal of a strongman does not necessarily remove strongman rule; it may replace personal authority with a harder military-security coalition.
Punishment Was Substituted for Strategy
Robert Pape’s research on air power offers another way to identify the error. His study of more than 30 bombing campaigns distinguishes denial from punishment. Denial seeks to prevent the opponent from achieving its military objectives. Punishment seeks to impose costs on society, the economy or political leadership until the opponent’s will collapses. Pape finds denial generally more effective than punishment.
The initial U.S. objectives contained a recognisable denial strategy: destroy missiles before they could be launched, degrade naval forces threatening Hormuz and prevent the reconstruction of a nuclear weapons pathway. But as the war continued, Trump’s threats increasingly emphasised punishment against bridges, power plants, economic life and the physical survival of the leadership.
Punishment can demonstrate power. It does not necessarily specify the mechanism by which power produces the desired political settlement. If attacks strengthen the target’s belief that its survival is at stake, more pain may generate more resistance rather than less. Force then becomes self-justifying: each failed round of coercion is treated as evidence that a larger round is required.
The repeated White House declarations of victory concealed this substitution. Tactical achievements were presented as proof that political objectives had been secured. When those objectives reappeared unresolved, the administration returned to bombing rather than reconsidering the causal theory connecting bombing to compliance.
The Case Against Declaring Failure
There is a serious counterargument. U.S. and Israeli operations killed Iran’s supreme leader and senior commanders, damaged missile, naval and nuclear capabilities, disrupted oil exports and imposed extraordinary economic costs. Iran entered the war under severe domestic and financial strain and emerged weaker in important respects. A new agreement through Oman could still restore navigation, establish nuclear constraints and reduce hostilities. If that happens, military pressure will have contributed to the outcome.
This evidence matters. Any assessment that ignores it would confuse resilience with victory. The Islamic Republic has paid heavily, and its future stability is not assured.
Yet the counterargument does not vindicate the strongman theory. The theory promised that dramatic force and personal resolve would produce rapid submission on American terms. Instead, Washington announced victory twice, returned to war, consumed major military stocks, faced declining public support and eventually considered a maritime framework that could recognise an Iranian role in the very strait the United States claimed to control. Even a later compromise may demonstrate the value of bargaining under pressure; it would not demonstrate that maximal threats produced unconditional surrender.
Nor had the proposed Hormuz arrangement been completed by August 5. The definition of Iranian “control,” the inspection regime and the collection of fees remained contested. Tehran sought charges of between 5 and 7 per cent of cargo value; Oman discussed a lower figure, while Washington opposed tolls altogether. A strategic judgment must therefore remain provisional. But provisional does not mean evidence-free. Five months of repeated coercion without stable compliance are sufficient to show that the administration’s original causal theory did not work as advertised.
What a Coherent Coercive Strategy Would Require
The alternative to strongman coercion is not passivity. It is disciplined coercion: limited aims, prioritised demands, credible consequences and a believable off-ramp.
Washington needed to distinguish three separate objectives. The first was freedom of navigation through Hormuz. The second was a verifiable nuclear settlement. The third was Iran’s political future. Treating all three as components of surrender made every concession appear to Tehran as the beginning of another demand.
A more coherent strategy would have defined a narrow sequence: toll-free commercial passage under internationally supervised security arrangements; reciprocal and verifiable military de-escalation; nuclear limits tied to specified sanctions or blockade relief; and an explicit separation between those negotiations and the question of regime change. Oman and Gulf governments could have served not merely as messengers but as institutional guarantors of implementation.
Such a strategy would still require military leverage. But it would use force to support a settlement rather than treat force as a substitute for one. Most importantly, it would answer the question Trump’s policy left unresolved: what, exactly, would Iran receive if it complied?
The Failure Was Political, Not Military
Strongman politics is effective at producing images of command. Warships, missile launches, public deadlines and sudden declarations of victory compress a complicated conflict into a familiar spectacle: one leader acts, another retreats. But international outcomes are not produced by spectacle alone. They depend on institutions, incentives, credibility, geography, time and the adversary’s perception of the choices available to it.
As of August 5, the Strait of Hormuz was the clearest verdict. Trump said the United States controlled it. Maritime traffic showed that control without commercial confidence was close to meaningless. Iran, though heavily damaged, was negotiating over authority in the waterway rather than accepting exclusion from it. The agreement declared historic had not held. The regime whose leader had been killed had not collapsed. The coercive institutions Washington intended to weaken had become more politically central.
This was not a defeat of American military power. It was a failure to translate military power into a sustainable political arrangement. Trump’s threats were credible; his limits were not. He convinced Tehran that the United States was willing to escalate, but not that Iranian concessions would bring escalation to an end.
That is why the strongman theory failed. It assumed that sufficiently intense fear would eventually eliminate political choice. In practice, fear changed the choice. Faced with demands that appeared to threaten the survival of the governing order, the Islamic Republic treated continued resistance, however costly, as safer than submission. The stronger the strongman performed, the less credible the exit became.